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I. INTRODUCTION
In two decisions concerning sexual harassment, Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton' and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,2 the Supreme
Court, on the last day of its 1997-1998 term finally articulated coherent
vicarious liability rules critical for bounding the scope of the
discrimination prohibitions in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3
The Court did so by explaining the meaning of the inclusion of "any
agent" in Title VII's definition of "employer.'" The meaning of "agent"
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1. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
2. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
4. "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person. ... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Title VII's prohibitions of
discrimination run against "an employer," but not directly against individuals or agents.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
in this definition is critical for establishing employer liability because
almost all Title VII-protected employees work for corporations and other
legal fictions which can act, and thus discriminate, only through human
agents The scope of Title VII, moreover, in part turns derivatively on
the definition of "agent" because the Act's proscriptions do not render
discriminating employees individually liable.
Perhaps appreciating that a restrictive interpretation of "agent" could
qualify Title VII's promise, courts consistently have held firms liable for
the discriminatory decisions of some of their employees when the formal
employment status of other employees is changed-such as through
discharge, suspension, hiring, promotion, demotion, or compensation
increase or decrease.7 The recognition by courts that Title VII may
protect employees who suffer discrimination in working conditions,
even when their formal job status is not changed, however, has
presented more difficult questions regarding when employers should be
held responsible.9
Justice Souter in Faragher and Justice Kennedy in Ellerth, in two
separate opinions for the Court,'0 provided a new analytical structure to
5. The definition of "person" in the Act "includes one or more individuals,
governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock
companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under Title
11, or receivers." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994).
6. This is at least the position taken by most courts. See, e.g., Lissau v. Southern
Food Serv., 159 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998); Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400
(6th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir.
1995); Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995). A few decisions
suggested that individual employees can be held liable as agents under the definition of
employer in Title VII. See, e.g., Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir.
1989). Such a view seems even harder to sustain after Congress, in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, provided for damage actions against employers that are limited based on the
size of the employer's workforce. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1994).
7. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). This result has
proven no less true in sex discrimination cases involving sexual harassment. See infra
note 12.
8. The Supreme Court's acceptance of such a Title VII cause of action was in a
sexual harassment case, Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986), but the
Court noted that Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), the first of the
discriminatory work environment cases, involved national origin discrimination.
9. For instance, the en banc Seventh Circuit decision reviewed in Ellerth, and its
companion case, Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, resulted in eight opinions, each
taking somewhat different positions. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d
490 (7th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh Circuit decision reviewed in Faragher was also en
banc and split that court 7-5. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th
Cir. 1997).
10. Six other Justices, including Justice Kennedy, joined Justice Souter's opinion
in Faragher. Five other Justices, including Justice Souter, joined Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Ellerth. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's Faragher opinion, but,
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govern employer liability for cases where the agent perpetrating the
actionable discrimination is a supervisor of the victim. Though their
analyses were only congruent, and not identical, Justices Souter and
Kennedy took care to announce their holdings in the exact same words:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two necessary
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive o, corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
By allowing no defense in cases where a "tangible employment
action" is taken, the decisions confirm the accepted law that employers
are always liable under Title VII for actionable, discrimination-based
decisionmaking by supervisory employees that changes the formal job
status of other employees.'2 More importantly, the Court's twice-stated
new analytical structure makes clear that employers are liable for their
supervisory employees' creation of discriminatory working
environments, except where employers can establish the articulated two-
pronged affirmative defense.
Language in the mutual holding of Faragher and Ellerth, as well as in
the analysis of each opinion, understandably makes particular reference
to sexual harassment, as each case involved this form of discrimination.
In Faragher, the trial court found that two lifeguards employed by the
city of Boca Raton as supervisors discriminated on the basis of sex
without any illuminating explanation, only concurred in the judgment in Ellerth. I18 S.
Ct. at 2271. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, penned dissenting opinions in each
case.
11. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at2293; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct at2270.
12. See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 1994); Kotcher v. Rosa
& Sullivan Appliance Ctr., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913
F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311,
1316 (11th Cir. 1989). The aforementioned cases are all cited in Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at
2285. However, Faragher's characterization of this automatic employer liability rule as
"unanimous" may have been an overstatement. See Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172
(4th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that a harasser who denies an employee tangible job benefits
must be the employee's supervisor in order for the employer to be automatically liable);
Sims v. Brown & Root Indus., 889 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. La. 1995), aff'd without opinion,
78 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting automatic employer liability in a "quid pro quo"
sexual harassment situation where the victim suffered a pay cut).
against Faragher, one of the guards they supervised, by maintaining an
abusive working environment through vulgarities, sexual comments,
gestures, and touching. In Ellerth, the plaintiff offered to prove that
one of her supervisors subjected her "to constant sexual harassment"
through "repeated boorish and offensive remarks and gestures" and at
least three incidents of "threats to deny her tangible job benefits."'4
Notwithstanding Justice Thomas's allegation in his Ellerth dissent that
the Court had fashioned tougher standards for employer liability in
sexual than in racial harassment cases, 5 it is clear that the Court's new
analytic structure will apply to all forms of Title VII-proscribed
discrimination. In order to solve the employer liability issue in both
Faragher and Ellerth, the Court utilized common law principles as well
as Title VII policy and precedent to interpret the meaning of "agent" in
Title VII's definition of employer. The Court cited nothing (and could
have found nothing) in the language, structure, or history of Title VII
that would warrant interpreting "agent" differently for purposes of sex
discrimination, than for purposes of race, color, religion, or national
origin discrimination. 6  Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly
recognized that sexual harassment is covered by Title VII only as a form
of sex discrimination, 7 just as racial harassment is covered as a form of
race discrimination. 8 The courts, therefore, should and can be expected
13. 118 S. Ct. at 2277.
14. 118 S. Ct. at 2262. After accepting review in Faragher, the Court also granted
certiorari in Ellerth to explore whether the presence of unfulfilled threats to deny
tangible job benefits should place a case in that category ("quid pro quo" supervisory
harassment for purposes of sexual harassment) for which employers would incur
absolute vicarious liability. See id. The mutual holding in Ellerth and Faragher
answered this question in the negative; employers may assert the affirmative defense in
any case, such as Ellerth, where the threats are not fulfilled. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at
2275; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2257.
15. 118 S. Ct. at 2271.
16. See generally Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2275; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2257. Any
law formulated to treat the agency problem in sexual harassment cases must also define
the law governing Title VII's coverage of all other forms of not only sex, but also race,
color, religion, and national origin discrimination. If a company is to be vicariously
liable for an employee's decision to pay an average-performing black employee less than
an average-performing white employee, then the company must be liable for a male
employee's decision to pay less to a female employee who refuses to have sex with him
than he would pay an otherwise comparable male employee from whom sex would not
be requested. Conversely, if a company is not to be vicariously liable for the actions of
one of its employee-supervisors subjecting a female subordinate to continual sexist
taunts and insults, then the company should not be vicariously liable for the supervisor's
actions subjecting a black subordinate to racist taunts and insults.
17. The Court maintained its focus on sex discrimination in each of the three
sexual harassment cases it previously decided. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993);
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
18. Female employees who suffer the effects of a work environment in which they
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to apply the approach of Faragher and Ellerth to all forms of Title VII-
proscribed discrimination.19
Employers who wish to eliminate sexual and other forms of
discriminatory harassment at their work sites should welcome the
Faragher and Ellerth decisions. These decisions promise employers
insulation from liability under Title VII for discriminatory work
environments that the employers took reasonable steps to prevent and
correct. Unless their employees are victimized by some tangible
employment action, in most cases employers should be able to escape or
at least substantially mitigate liability by promulgating and
implementing effective anti-discrimination policies.
Title VII plaintiffs also should welcome Faragher and Ellerth. Prior
to these decisions, some courts effectively required a plaintiff who did
not suffer the loss of some formal employment status to prove that any
discrimination suffered in the work environment was caused by the
are continually disparaged and assaulted are victims of sex discrimination in much the
same way that black employees are victims of race discrimination in a working
environment that disparages and assaults them. In these instances, male employees and
white employees, respectively are not receiving equivalent disparaging treatment.
Additionally, the prevalence of demands for sexual favors in many sexual harassment
cases does not render sexual and racial discrimination incomparable forms of
discrimination. A female employee whose protection from discharge is conditioned on
her willingness to engage in sexual acts is equivalent to a black male employee whose
job is dependent on his willingness to perform demeaning services not required of his
white peers. The female employee may be said to be a victim of a form of "sex-plus"
discrimination, as the black male employee is a victim of "race-plus" discrimination.
Cf., e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employment policies
that require female employees, but not male employees, to be free of preschool children
may be prohibited as sex discrimination). In each case, more is required of the employee
than would have been required of a comparable employee who did not share the same
Title VII-protected status.
Thus, Professor Schultz fairly criticizes any lower court decisions that have treated
sexual harassment as somehow distinct from intentional sex discrimination under Title
VII. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,
1713 (1998). Professor Schultz criticizes lower court decisions that take into account
only sexual advances, and not other forms of sex discrimination, in considering whether
a working environment is sufficiently hostile to be actionable. Id.
19. Courts already have begun applying the decisions to other forms of
discrimination. See, e.g., Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581
(5th Cir. (1998) (race discrimination); Wright-Simmons v. Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d
1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (race discrimination); Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 17 F.
Supp. 2d 735 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (race discrimination). See also Wallin v. Minnesota
Dep't of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 688 n.7 (8th Cir. 1998) (dicta concerning disability
discrimination under Americans with Disability Act).
20. Employers should be able to escape or mitigate liability in most cases, but not
all. See infra text accompanying notes 31-33.
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negligence of management.2' To do so, a plaintiff had to prove that
management knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, of the discriminatory environment, and that management failed
to take reasonable remedial action. The employers in both Faragher and
Ellerth asked the Court to adopt this negligence standard for supervisory
sexual harassment that does not include the loss of formal job status or
benefits.2"
The affirmative defense-qualified vicarious liability standard adopted
in Faragher and Ellerth should prove more favorable to plaintiffs than
the negligence standard for several reasons. First, the Faragher-Ellerth
approach places the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
employer's preventive and corrective actions upon the employer, the
party that has the best evidence of the actions at issue. Moreover,
placement of the burden of proof may be critical to the outcome of a
case in which the trier of fact is uncertain about the reasonableness of
the actions of either the employer or the victimized employee.
Second, Faragher-Ellerth's qualified vicarious liability standard
avoids a causation issue that can be problematic for plaintiffs in
negligence cases. For instance, in the decision reviewed in Faragher,
the Eleventh Circuit, applying a negligence standard, perfunctorily
dismissed the relevance of Boca Raton's ineffective dissemination of its
anti-harassment policy by asserting that the "district court did not find
that the City would have known about the harassment if it had
effectively disseminated this policy." Similarly, Justice Thomas in his
Faragher dissent argued that the Court should have adopted a
negligence standard under which Boca Raton would escape liability if
the failure to disseminate its policy was not shown to have prevented its
city managers from learning of Faragher's victimization.24
By contrast, Justice Souter's majority opinion decides against Boca
Raton without any consideration of causation. Souter's decision is based
on the city's failure to disseminate its policy, to otherwise monitor
lifeguard supervisors, and to assure possible complainants that they
21. See, e.g., Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997);
Nash v. Electrospace Sys., 9 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1993); Bums v. McGregor Elec.
Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992); Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558
(4th Cir. 1987).
22. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998);
Respondent's Brief at 17-31, Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
23. Faragher v. City of BocaRaton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1539 n.11 (11th Cir. 1997).
24. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2294 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas's opinion does
not clearly indicate whether the plaintiff or the employer should have the burden of
proving the causation issue. On the one hand, it states that the "City should be allowed
to show" that the failure to disseminate was not the primary cause of Faragher's
victimization. Id. On the other hand, it asserts that the plaintiff "would of course bear
the burden of proving the City's negligence." Id.
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could bypass harassing supervisors 5 The only causation nexus that was
relevant under the vicarious liability standard in Faragher was one that
connected the harassing supervisors' discriminatory motivation (their
intentionally different treatment of female subordinates) with Faragher's
victimization.
Third, imposing liability on employers who inadequately prevent or
correct discriminatory harassment through a vicarious liability theory
(rather than through a direct condemnation of the negligence of
management in preventing harassment) clarifies that the intent of
harassers to discriminate and to act with reckless indifference toward
Title VII-protected rights can be imputed to employers? for purposes of
assessing compensatory and punitive damages under section 102 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.2 Had the Court adopted a negligence
standard, a defendant employer whose anti-harassment policy was
judged to be deficient could have argued that negligence is an
unintentional tort, and that while the deficient policy may have
disparately impacted plaintiffs and their Title VII-protected class,
management did not intend to discriminate against women, or any other
victimized protected class, by adopting its neutral lax policy.? Tff
25. See id. at 2293.
26. See Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that under Faragher and Ellerth a manager's "reckless" discrimination
can be imputed to an employer for purposes of assigning punitive damages).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII
remedies were limited to reinstatement, back pay, and other forms of equitable relief.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994). Section 102 of the 1991 Act for the first time
allowed the victims of Title VII discrimination to recover limited legal damages, but
only for "intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful
because of its disparate impact) ... " 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), and punitive damages,
but only for "discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(1).
28. Some courts have held under common law principles that an employer who is
held liable for the intentional torts of its employees on a negligent failure to supervise
theory cannot be subjected to all the damages that could be collected against the
tortfeasing employees unless the employer authorized, participated in, or ratified the
wrongful act of the servant. See, e.g., Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 464
(N.J. 1993) (plaintiff could not recover punitive damages for supervisory sexual
harassment occurring outside the scope of supervisor's authority, where employer
liability was based on negligence for not having a policy banning sexual harassment).
See also Preston v. Income Producing Management, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 411 (D. Kan.
1994); Mason v. City of New York, 949 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But see
Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1994) (under
Oklahoma law a corporate employer is liable for punitive damages for negligence
because it has a "nondelegable" duty not to hire or retain dangerous workers).
argument is foreclosed by an interpretation of "agent" in the definition
of employer in Title VII which, in the absence of an adequate preventive
and corrective policy, includes harassing supervisors."
Finally, by requiring employers to prove both that the employers acted
reasonably, and that plaintiffs "unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer,""
the Faragher-Elerth approach clarifies that when both the employer and
the employee victim have acted reasonably, the costs of the
discriminatory harassment are to be imposed on the employer.
Reasonable preventive and corrective action by both the employer and
the victimized employee may result in employer liability for
discriminatory harassment in at least three situations. First, a situation
may exist in which a particular victim reasonably chooses not to take
advantage of an employer's generally reasonable preventive system,
perhaps because of the victim's reasonable fear that the importance of
the harasser's contributions to the firm make employer retaliation, rather
than corrective action, probable.31 Second, there may be a case in which
a victim does invoke an employer's preventive and corrective system
through a reasonable complaint, but the employer's reasonable operation
of that system leads only to a stalemate of uncorroborated allegations
and denials. This situation may result in less than full compensation of
29. Although not relied upon by either the Faragher or the Ellerth Court,
Congressional expansion of remedies under Title VII indeed provides another
justification for the Court's rejection of a negligence standard in favor of a vicarious
liability standard. One of the reasons that Congress provided for legal damages in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to grant harassment victims meaningful relief. Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2(1) & 3(1), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (wherein
Congress found that "additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment" and Congress passed the Act "to provide appropriate remedies for
intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace"). The equitable
relief previously afforded by Title VII generally could not benefit victims of harassment
who did not suffer a loss of some tangible employment benefit. See supra note 27. See
also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 74 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that
backpay would be available only to those hostile work environment victims who could
claim constructive discharge). In addition, House Report 102-40 states:
[v]ictims of intentional sexual or religious discrimination in employment terms
and conditions often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering. This
distress often manifests itself in emotional disorders and medical problems.
Victims of discrimination often suffer substantial out-of-pocket expenses as a
result of the discrimination, none of which is compensable with equitable
remedies.
H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 25 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549. Thus,
adoption of a negligence standard and the insulation of negligent employers from
compensatory damages would have conflicted with the Congressional design of section
102 of the 1991 Act.
30. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2279; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2261.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 107-11.
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the victim for harassment that the victim could have proven through
more formal Title VII litigation. 2 Third, a case may exist in which an
employee suffers significant harm because of a sudden, severe act of
discrimination, such as a sexual assault, that the employee could not
reasonably have anticipated or avoided by invocation of the employer's
reasonable preventive or corrective system. The Faragher-Ellerth
affirmative defense does not allow the reasonable employer to insulate
itself from liability for the sudden severe discriminatory act if the victim
promptly reports that act after its commission. 33
Thus, the analytical structure provided in Faragher and Ellerth
includes elements that should be attractive to most parties to the debate
on the Title VII agency question. Clearly, the Court in these cases
crafted an extraordinarily fine example of the kind of interpretive law
that modem regulatory statutes often require. Nevertheless, in both
decisions the Court's use of common law agency principles was too
formulaic, and its invocation of Title VII policy and precedent was too
truncated to be either fully convincing or adequately explicative of the
meaning of the structure to be applied to future difficult cases.
The remainder of this article will attempt, in part, to compensate for
any deficiency in this analysis by more fully explaining a policy-based
defense of the holding. This policy analysis will allow for a prediction,
or at least a recommendation, of resolutions for a number of important
questions which Faragher and Ellerth raise, but do not fully resolve.
These include: 1) what exactly constitutes a "tangible" employment
action; 2) what deficiencies in an employer's preventive or corrective
opportunities would justify a victim not taking advantage of those
opportunities; 3) whether a victim's failure to report earlier harassment
pursuant to an employer's reasonable complaint processes should
prevent the victim from recovering for harassment the victim did report;
4) whether a victim's unreasonable failure to avoid or mitigate the
harassment may qualify the liability of even a negligent employer; and
5) whether the affirmative defense-qualified vicarious liability approach
of these cases should also be applied to discriminatory harassment from
co-workers.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 110-16.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 115-20.
II. THE INTERPRETIVE COMMON LAW OF FARAGHER AND ELLERTH
The Supreme Court addressed the Title VII agency question in a
previous sexual harassment decision, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.
4
In that case the Court declined "to issue a definitive rule on employer
liability," but concluded that "Congress wanted courts to look to agency
principles for guidance," even though "common-law principles may not
be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.''3 When, in Faragher
and Ellerth, the Justices deemed it time to attempt to formulate a
definitive rule, they seemed to recognize that the common law of agency
is too variant between jurisdictions and too much in flux to be easily
transferable to the Title VII statutory scheme.
Instead, as Justice Kennedy acknowledged in Ellerth, the Court had to
choose from among several common law doctrines, and thus rely on
what he termed "the general common law of agency, rather than on the
law of any particular State," to formulate "a uniform and predictable
standard... as a matter of federal law."3 Yet, contrary to the claim of
Justice Thomas in his dissent37 the Faragher-Ellerth Court did not cut
its new federal law standard out of "whole-cloth."3 Rather, the majority
in each of the cases looked to the purposes, structure, and compromises
of Title VII, as well as the guidelines expressed in Meritor, to limit
responsibly the exercise of a law-making power delegated by Congress
through the use of the general agency term in Title VII's definition of
employer. Given the lack of evidence of any more specific
Congressional intent on the issue, it is difficult to understand how any
other formulation of a general standard for employer liability for Title
VII-proscribed discrimination could have constituted a more modest
degree of law making."
34. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
35. Id. at 72.
36. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
37. Id. at 2273.
38. Cf. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544 (1994) (relying on
a "common law" rule to interpret federal statute).
39. The holdings in Faragher and Ellerth are somewhat reminiscent of the holding
of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989). In Price Waterhouse Justice Brennan held that, while Congress did not intend
the proscription of discrimination in Title VII to require plaintiffs to prove that a
discriminatory motive was a necessary cause of any adverse employment decisions that
they question, Congress did intend to provide employers the opportunity to prove the
absence of such necessary causation as an affirmative defense. However, in light of the
variant and developing meaning of "agent" in the many common law jurisdictions, the
Court's assumption in Faragher and Ellerth of delegated authority to formulate an
affirmative defense seems less open to question than Justice Brennan's assumption that
Congress intended to delegate authority in order to fashion a compromise on the
necessary causation question at issue in Price Waterhouse.
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Both Justice Souter's opinion in Faragher and Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Ellerth begin their analyses of agency law with a citation of
the general principle, as stated in section 219(1) of the Restatement of
Agency, that a "master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment." The two
opinions' treatments of this principle vary appreciably, however. The
Ellerth opinion rather easily concludes that as a "general rule... sexual
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of
employment" because the "harassing supervisor often acts for personal
motives, motives unrelated and even antithetical to the objectives of the
employer."'4  The Ellerth opinion relies on the traditional agency
principle, as set forth in section 228(1)(c) of the Restatement, that to be
within the scope of employment, conduct must be "actuated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the master. 42
By contrast, Justice Souter's Faragher opinion finds problematic the
application of the scope of employment standard to sexual harassment
by a supervisor. Souter's opinion notes that a number of prominent
decisions in this century have read the scope of employment test more
expansively to allow vicarious liability against an employer for
"intentional torts [including a number of sexual assaults] that were in no
sense inspired by any purpose to serve the employer."' The opinion
references these cases generally to demonstrate "differing judgments
about the desirability of holding an employer liable for his subordinates'
wayward behavior," and at least some of the cases more specifically to
demonstrate "that the employer should be liable for those faults that may
be fairly regarded as risks of his business, whether they are committed in
furthering it or not." The opinion then recognizes that these cases
40. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. at 2286; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2266.
41. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at2266.
42. RESTATm (SECOND) oFAGENcY § 228(1)(c) (1958).
43. Justice Souter cited first the case of Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States,
398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), in which Judge Friendly found the government liable for
the damage caused by a drunken sailor's opening of water valves on a drydock upon
returning from a night of heavy drinking. The sailor was clearly not motivated by a
desire to serve the employer, but Judge Friendly stressed that a sailor's drinking on leave
was "characteristic" and not "unforeseeable." Souter also cited Leonbruno v. Champlain
Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1920), in which an employer was liable for foreseeable
horseplay, and Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946) (en banc), where the
employer was liable for an employee's assault on a co-employee. Souter also cited six
additional cases finding employers liable for their employees' personally motivated
sexual assaults. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2287.
44. Faragher, 118 S. CL at 2287-88 (quoting Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1037
would support treating all sexual harassment by supervisors as within
the scope of employment precisely because such behavior is pervasive
and "persistent" and therefore should be anticipated by employers "as
one of the costs of doing business, to be charged to the enterprise rather
than the victim."5 Nevertheless, Souter's Faragher opinion stops short
of applying the scope of employment standard in this manner for two
reasons: first, a lack of evidence that Congress wanted to ignore the
traditional distinction of intentional "frolics or detours from the course
of employment ' 6 and second, a concern that an expansive application
would lead to employer vicarious liability for sexual harassment by
coworkers as well as supervisors.'
Neither the Ellerth nor the Faragher Court persuasively tied its
analysis of the scope of employment standard to the common holding of
the two cases. That holding, as stated above, imposes vicarious liability
on employers without affording them a newly crafted affirmative
defense only when a victim of discrimination has been harmed by a
"tangible employment action."2 Yet both Justice Kennedy and Justice
Souter acknowledged that employees sometimes may discriminate
against other employees without taking tangible employment action and
still satisfy even the traditional, 'at-least-in-part-motivated-by-a-
purpose-to-serve-the-employer' test for the scope of employment
standard. Justice Kennedy allowed that there are "instances, of course,
where a supervisor engages in unlawful discrimination with the purpose,
mistaken or otherwise, to serve the employer," citing a district court case
where a supervisor engaged in sexual harassment with the intent of
furthering the employer's policy of discouraging women from seeking
49advancement. In suggesting that Congress wanted to preserve a
distinction of "frolics or detours" from employee actions at least in part
motivated by a purpose to serve the employer, Justice Souter noted that
even this distinction would place within the scope of employment
discriminatory acts to placate prejudiced co-workers. It would also
place within the scope of employment the use of harsher disciplinary
words against delinquent workers in a Title VII protected class than
(2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 5 F. HARmER, ET AL., LAw oF ToRTs § 26.8, at 40-41 (2d ed.
1986))).
45. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2288. This position is more fully developed in Alan 0.
Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988).
46. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2288.
47. Id. at 2288-89.
48. Id. at 2279; Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2257, 2261 (1998).
49. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2266 (citing Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766
F. Supp. 1052, 1075 (M.D. Ala. 1990)).
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those words used against similarly delinquent workers not in that class."
The Faragher and the Ellerth opinions also do not use the scope of
employment standard to justify their imposition of irrebuttable vicarious
liability on employers for tangible employment actions. In Faragher,
Justice Souter noted that this rule has been uniformly adopted by the
lower courts under a variety of theories, including one based on "scope
of authority." However, he endorsed no theory in particular to support
the decision's ultimate holding.1 Justice Kennedy in Ellerth did endorse
a particular theory, but it was not one based on the scope of employment
vicarious liability standard.,2 Instead, Justice Kennedy asserted that the
rule of absolute employer liability for Title VII-proscribed
discrimination resulting in tangible employment actions "reflects a
correct application" of a standard drawn from the Restatement of
Agency's exceptions to the insulation of employers for employee torts
committed outside the scope of employment.53 That exception, where
50. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2288-89. In each case, the discriminatory act would, in
part, serve employer interests. However, Justice Souter did not seem to appreciate that
just as the "scope of employment" test is too inclusive to serve his purposes, it is also too
exclusive. See infra note 52.
51. Faragher, 118 S. Ct at 2285.
52. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268. Although noted by neither opinion, a "scope of
employment" standard limited by the "at-least-in-part-motivated-by-a-purpose-to-serve-
the-employer" test would not only sweep in some cases where no tangible employment
benefits were denied victims, it would also exclude some cases where such benefits were
denied. For example, under this standard had the Recreation Department of Boca Raton
decided to close a beach and dismiss three lifeguards in order to save money, a decision
to choose Faragher and two of her female co-guards for dismissal because they were"sexually uncooperative" females could be imputed to the city because the decision
would have been made in part to advance the city's budget-cutting policy. Yet, if
Faragher and the two others had been dismissed only for the purpose of replacing them
with three less experienced male or "cooperative" female guards to appeal to the Chief
Guard's sexist preferences, it is hard to understand how the dismissal would have been
affected as part of some task undertaken for the city. Compare, for instance, the
following illustration from section 235 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY:
P, a railroad company, employs A as a freight brakeman and instructs him to
eject trespassers from the train. A permits persons to ride upon the freight
train upon payment to him of a small amount. He ejects T, one of A's regular
customers, for failure to pay the bribe. A's act is not within the scope of
employment.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 235 cmt. a, illus. 3 (1958). By making A a
personnel officer with authority to discharge or "eject" unneeded or unproductive
employees from the employment train, and by making the bribe a sexual favor, the
RESTATEMENT's illustration can be read to deny employer liability for some
discriminatory discharges.
53. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
the employee is "aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation,"' 4 also serves as the doctrinal basis for the rest of the
Faragher-Ellerth holding.
In both Faragher and Ellerth the Court relied on the "aided-by-
agency-relation" exception as the common law principle warranting
employer liability for some supervisory discriminatory harassment that
does not result in tangible employment actions. In both cases, the Court
first distinguished this exception from that of the use of "apparent
authority." The latter exception had been invoked by several lower
courts55 and by the EEOC to extend potential employer liability.56 It is
set forth in the same subsection of the Restatement of Agency as the
"aided-by-agency-relation" exception.57  Justice Kennedy in Ellerth,
however, indicated that apparent authority analysis only could be
relevant where the harasser claims to have supervisory authority at the
workplace that he or she does not have.58 Presumably, Justice Kennedy
assumed that no victim could reasonably believe that a supervisor had
authority to harass; therefore, only a supervisor's actual, or apparent,
authority to supervise could advance his or her discriminatory
harassment. In his Faragher opinion Justice Souter seemed to agree; he
asserted that the subsection of the Restatement setting forth both
exceptions is intended to cover the abuse of actual agency authority as
well as that of apparent authority. 9
54. RESTATEMENT(SECoND) OFAGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
55. See, e.g., Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir.
1994); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994); Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,
830 F.2d 1554, 1559 (lth Cir. 1987). See also Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (endorsing apparent authority standard, but finding it inapplicable to case).
Cf. generally Jones v. Federated Fin. Reserve Corp., 144 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 1998) (using
apparent authority theory to extend employer liability under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act).
56. See EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 405:6681, 6697 (March 19, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance].
57. Section 219(2)(d) of the RESTATEmENT (SECOND) oFAGENCY states:
A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside
the scope of their employment, unless:
id) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort
by the existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
58. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2260.
59. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2278 (1998). The use of an
"apparent authority" theory by the EEOC and some lower courts, however, was based on
the reasonable assumption that, in the absence of a strong anti-harassment policy, a
victimized employee can reasonably believe that the employer accepted the harassment,
even if it did not authorize it. See, e.g., EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 56 ('in the
absence of a strong... policy against sexual harassment... employees [may] believe
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Both Justices Souter and Kennedy then suggested how a supervisor's
authority might facilitate his or her discriminatory harassment. Souter
was less tentative, asserting that the "agency relationship affords contact
with an employee subjected to a supervisor's sexual harassment, and the
victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing the whistle
on a superior."' Justice Kennedy agreed that a "supervisor's power and
authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular
threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by
the agency relation.' Justice Kennedy, however, also acknowledged
the "malleable terminology" of the "aided-by-agency-relation" exception
and noted that "there are acts of harassment a supervisor might commit
which might be the same acts a co-employee would commit, and there
may be some circumstances where the supervisor's status makes little
difference."'62 Kennedy cited "this tension" as a justification for looking
beyond strictly common law-based considerations in formulating the
Faragher-Ellerth rule.6 '3
Ultimately, Justices Souter and Kennedy had to look elsewhere (other
than to common law precedent) to support their holding on employer
liability for supervisory harassment. They cited no common law cases
in their cursory, formal, and rather abstract discussion of the
Restatement exception on which they relied. In fact, there seem to be no
common law cases that allow any kind of affirmative defense to
employers. Indeed, as Justice Kennedy stated, the "aided-by-agency-
relation" exception is still a "developing feature of agency law.""
Morever, as he did not acknowledge, the cases that might be cited to
support this exception also could have been decided under the expanded
"scope of authority" analysis for foreseeable intentional torts." Thus,
that a harassing supervisor's actions will be ignored, tolerated or condoned"). Such an
assumption is not unrealistic given the economic advantages for employers in not
challenging the uncontrolled prejudices and urges of some employees.
60. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
61. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2269-70.
64. Id. at 2269.
65. See, e.g., Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (trucking company
was liable for a deliveryman's rape of a customer where an agency relationship enabled
the rapist to enter the victim's premises); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d
1341 (Cal. 1991) (city was liable for a rape committed by a police officer while on duty);
Graves v. Wayne County, 333 N.W.2d 740 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (county which
required officers to be armed at all times could be liable for a deputy sheriff's off-duty
shooting of a man discovered with the deputy's girlfriend); Rodgers v. Kemper Constr.
the Faragher-Ellerth formulation was not compelled by common law
agency principles; it depended on other policy-based considerations.
Justices Souter and Kennedy did in fact offer some such
considerations. On the one hand, the Faragher opinion recognizes a
rationale for imposing liability on employers for all Title VHI-proscribed
discrimination inflicted at work: employers can reasonably foresee that
their enterprises provide opportunities for such discrimination, and
therefore they should bear the costs as part of the costs of doing
business.66
On the other hand, both the Faragher and the Ellerth opinions
advance several policy-based reasons for having that liability be limited
by the affirmative defense afforded to employers. First, each opinion
stresses jurisprudential policy requiring adherence to prior statutory
interpretation and refers to language in Meitor asserting that the court
of Appeals in that case "erred in concluding that employers are always
automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors."67
Second, the two 1998 opinions declare that giving "credit... to
employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty" to
prevent violations of Title VW would advance the "primary objective"
of Title VII, the avoidance of further discriminatory harm,69 and would
do so by promoting "conciliation rather than litigation."7 Finally, each
decision states that employer liability for harms created by
discriminatory harassment must be limited by "the avoidable
consequences doctrine,"7' as "imported from the general theory of
damages, that a victim has a duty 'to use such means as are reasonable
under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages' that result
from violations of the statute."'72 The Ellerth opinion also elaborates that
use of this doctrine "could encourage employees to report harassing
conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive," and thus could "also
Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (Ct. App. 1975) (construction subcontractor was liable for a
drunken worker's assault of two employees of a contractor).
66. This rationale is a synthesis of Justice Souter's discussions in Faragher of the
justifications for employer vicarious liability under the "scope of employment" standard,
see supra text accompanying notes 44-45, and under the "aided-by-the-agency-relation"
exception, see supra text accompanying note 60. Justice Kennedy's analysis in Ellerth
of the justifications for employer vicarious liability never goes beyond parsing of the
language of the RESTATEMENT and the citation of common law and Title VII precedent.
See generally Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2257.
67. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57, 72 (1986).
68. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292.
69. Id. at 2292 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
70. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
71. Id.
72. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219,
231 n.15 (1982)) (quoting C. McCormick, LAW OF DAMAGES 127 (1935)). Ellerth cites
the same footnote of the Ford Motor case. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
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serve Title Vii's deterrent purpose.""
This policy analysis roughly supports the Faragher-Ellerth holding,
and it further suggests a more complete analysis. However, it is
insufficiently developed for the purpose of directing courts in future
difficult cases or for convincingly answering arguments against the
Faragher-Ellerth approach. For instance, under Justice Souter's own
analysis, if an employer causes some extra level of discriminatory
harassment by the operation of some particular enterprise from which it
benefits, why should its reasonable efforts to prevent that harassment
insulate it from having to incur the harassment's costs? Such insulation
will encourage the employer to adopt a particular level of preventive
policy that the courts define as reasonable. However, removing the
insulation would also encourage employers to prevent harassment in
order to avoid incurring its costs." Indeed, removing the insulation
might encourage more prevention if the courts underestimate the
benefits of extra prevention in setting a standard of reasonableness. In
any event, removing the insulation arguably could never result in a lower
level of employer prevention efforts because rational employers will set
their levels of prevention based on a comparison of the marginal costs of
prevention against the marginal costs of their extra liability, regardless
of whether their liability is absolute or qualified.
Justice Kennedy's statement in Ellerth that "limiting employer
liability could encourage employees to report harassing conduct"
begins to answer this argument, but it raises further questions. Why
cannot the same point be made to qualify employer liability for
discriminatory employee decisions that affect the "tangible" job benefits
of other employees? Would not requiring employees to utilize employer
processes to complain about such decisions encourage their correction,
as well as the prevention of additional aggravating discriminatory
decisions? Should not the "avoidable consequences doctrine" thus be
equally applicable to limit the liability of employers in cases where
"tangible" employment actions have been taken? Furthermore, Justice
Kennedy's statement does not explain why an employer's efforts to
prevent or correct harassment should be relevant to an employee's duty
to report; do we not want to encourage employee reporting in all cases?
73. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
74. See generally Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1980).
75. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
None of these questions are answered by the Court's citation of
Meritor. That precedent states that there should be some qualification
on employer liability for supervisory harassment, but it does not require
the particular limitation of Faragher-Ellerth.76 Moreover, although the
Court's stated reluctance to depart from a prior statutory interpretation is
commendable, statutory precedent is often set aside in the face of strong
policy arguments.' Clearly more elaboration than a citation to Meritor
is needed to guide future difficult cases.
HI. DEFINING EMPLOYER LIABILITY TO ADVANCE TITLE VII GOALS
Such an elaboration might begin with an iteration of the goals of Title
VII that the Faragher-Ellerth analytical structure should advance. The
Faraghe7 decision repeats the Court's early confirmation in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moodj9 that Title VII has dual objectives: the prevention
of future discriminatory harm and the provision of redress to make
victims whole for injuries from past discrimination.' Notwithstanding
the intervening passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its
expansion of remedies to include compensatory damagesI" the Faragher
decision also repeats the Moody Court's characterization of the
preventive goal as the "primary objective" of Title VII'
However, a stronger argument than that suggested by Justice Souter in
Faragher can be made that Title VII's "primary" goal of preventing
discrimination, as well as its complementary objective of remediation,
can be best advanced in many cases by imposing vicarious liability on
employers for the discriminatory harassment of employees conducted by
other employees. This argument would note, as did Justice Souter,s that
it seems entirely fair to require an employer to pay for the foreseeable
costs of any extra discriminatory harassment that its enterprise creates.
The argument also would stress that inefficient decisions will not be
encouraged by requiring employers to pay -such costs, regardless of
whether it would be cost efficient for the employer to take extra
preventive measures to curtail the harassment. The shutting of a
marginally profitable enterprise because it has had to pay for the costs of
discriminatory harassment that it cannot control is no more inefficient
76. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
77. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).
78. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. at 2292.
79. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
80. See id. at 417-19.
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
82. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 417).
83. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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than the shutting of a similar enterprise because of extraordinarily high
energy costs that it cannot avoid.
In order to tie the argument to Title VII's primary deterrent objective,
however, it should be stressed that making employers liable for the harm
caused by any discriminatory act of their employees would induce
employers to continue to expend more funds in the prevention of further
discrimination until further expenditures would exceed the marginal
costs of any further discrimination that these expenditures could
eliminate.M As suggested above, imposing liability on employers only
when triers of fact decide that they have not reasonably attempted to
prevent the discrimination would not lead to more prevention efforts
from employers (because rational employers would not make extra
inefficient expenditures to avoid liability under a negligence standard
any more than they would under a strict liability standard). Furthermore,
imposing liability only for negligence could lead to less prevention,
because triers of fact sometimes miscalculate efficient levels of
prevention.86
In a separate opinion of the Seventh Circuit decision reviewed in
Ellerth, Judge Posner argued that courts should apply a negligence rather
than what he calls a strict liability standard to govern employer liability
for the creation of hostile working environments by supervisors, as well
as by co-workers, because courts know basically what level of
prevention against hostile work environments is "reasonable." Imposing
liability in cases where that level of prevention has been obtained will
84. Judge Flaum, in his separate opinion in the Seventh Circuit decision reviewed
in Ellerth, seemed to appreciate this point with respect to cases such as Ellerth where
supervisors allegedly create discriminatory environments by making unfulfilled threats
that they will retaliate through some formal employment decision against subordinates
who do not grant them sexual favors. He noted that "Ij]iability in this situation serves
the goal of preventing such abuse from occurring by creating incentives for companies to
take steps in hiring and training their supervisors." Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am.,
123 F.3d 490, 500 (7th Cir. 1997) (consolidated with Ellerth for decision by the circuit
court). The same argument, however, applies to cases similar to Faragher where
supervisors create discriminatory hostile work enviromnents without any express threat
to use their authority or influence over the job status or compensation of the victim.
85. See supra text accompanying note 74.
86. For less prevention by employers to occur, courts would not always or even
usually have to underestimate the level of prevention that would be efficient. A rational
employer that knew it would be liable only when found negligent, would reduce its
prevention because of the likelihood of some underestimation. A rational employer
would calculate that cases of overestimation are not relevant because it would not wish
to purchase an inefficient level of prevention to avoid liability in any event.
only lead to employers internalizing such costs (and passing them on to
other employees or consumers) rather than to the prevention of any
further discrimination.'
This argument is flawed and unconvincing for several reasons. First,
as suggested above,8 the internalization of actual costs presumably
encourages efficient business decisions, even where it results in
bankruptcy rather than in any further prevention of discrimination in an
ongoing enterprise." Second, even if Judge Posner were correct in
stating that federal judges, or juries, could determine the exact level of
expenditures that would be "reasonably" incurred to prevent
discriminatory work environments by a "reasonable" employer (for
Judge Posner, presumably a rational, efficient employer), Title VII's
complementary goal of victim compensation as supplemented by the tort
principle of risk spreading provides justification for requiring that all the
costs of harassment be borne by employers." In whatever manner
employers spread costs among shareholders, employees, and customers,
employers that allow employees to harass certainly seem better
candidates for bearing the costs of discriminatory work environments
than are the presumably innocent victims of those environments. 9'
87. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 511, 513.
88. See supra text accompanying note 83.
89. Employers do not internalize all the costs of bankruptcy, including the impact
on the lives of employees. This is true of all displacement of employees, however, and
should be accounted for generally by public policy, rather than by using it as a
justification for the selective externalization of other particular costs.
90. This policy also provides justification, in the apparent view of Congress, for
the costs of litigation that Title VII regulation imposes on our society. As explained
earlier, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 affords victims of certain Title VII violations
punitive, as well as compensatory damages. See supra note 27. One might argue that
punitive damages are not justified by any victim compensation goal and that awarding
them might encourage a socially inefficient level of prevention if imposed on employers
simply because of supervisors' malicious or reckless harassment. However, the strict
caps placed on punitive as well as compensatory damages by the 1991 Act make the
inducement of excessive prevention unlikely. More importantly, Title VII's primary
goal is, presumably, maximum prevention of discrimination, rather than the achievement
of some limited "efficient" level of prevention.
91. As noted previously, the victims of harassment and other illegal discrimination
cannot sue the employee perpetrators under Title VII. See supra text accompanying note
6. However, actions may be brought under some state statutory and common law rules
against employee perpetrators (for public employees, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)) for
some forms of discrimination covered by Title VII, including sexual assaults. Victims of
violent sexual attacks at the workplace also may be able to recover compensatory and
punitive damages from their attackers under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.
See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). However, perpetrators often are not able to pay full
judgment costs.
Theoretically, employees could negotiate a clause in an employment contract allowing
for reimbursement for any harm from discriminatory harassment caused by fellow
employees. Statutes like Title VII, however, reasonably assume that such negotiations
never occur because of market imperfections. Judge Posner suggested that victim
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Most importantly, however, there is no reason to assume that federal
judges and juries are particularly adept at determining what steps
"reasonable," rational employers would take to avoid discriminatory
hostile work environments. The Court in Faragher and Ellerth declined
to define what would constitute "reasonable care" by an employer in
preventing harassment. Each decision allows that "an anti-harassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a
matter of law."" Most judges and juries might conclude that it would
not be reasonable to require employers to make special efforts to check
the backgrounds and overt prejudices of new hires, or to closely monitor
the workplace through the dispersal of hidden cameras and microphones.
If employers were required to bear the costs of all discriminatory work
environments, however, some employers might find that such
monitoring techniques cost less to implement (even accounting for the
price of the inevitable loss of employee privacy) than the costs of the
discrimination that this monitoring would eliminate. Other employers
might effectively change their corporate "culture" or make institutional
innovations that lead to more effective harassment control without a
sacrifice of employee privacy. For both sets of employers, the
substitution of unqualified employer vicarious liability for a negligence
standard would result in more preventive measures being taken.
In any event, the difficulty of applying negligence or reasonableness
standards to employer efforts to prevent hostile work environment
discrimination seems just as difficult as applying such standards to
employer efforts to avoid the formal or "tangible" discriminatory
personnel decisions that most federal judges, including all members of
the Faragher-Ellerth Court, as well as Judge Posner, have
acknowledged must be subject to unqualified employer vicarious
liability. A court reviewing, for instance, the reasonableness of a large
compensation can be ignored as a goal in Title VII hostile work environment cases
because deterrence of future harassment is the underlying goal of allowing damages for
pain and suffering and because victims rarely need compensation to be made whole. See
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 510 (7th Cir. 1997). Most victims of
racist and sexist work environments probably would not agree. Moreover, Congress
provided a compensatory damage remedy in the 1991 Civil Rights Act in part to address
the inadequacy of relief in harassment cases. See supra note 29. In any event, Judge
Posner's subordination of the compensatory goal of Title VII does not render it irrelevant
to resolving questions of allocation of damages in cases where the deterrence goal is
equally well served by strict liability or negligence standards.
92. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293(1998); Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2257, 2270 (1998).
employer's personnel department's review of a supervisor's
recommendation to deny a female employee a scheduled promotion
could test the department's good faith and reasonable efforts to avoid
accepting a discriminatory recommendation through some checklist at
least as meaningful as any that could be formulated for averting hostile
environment discrimination.93
Judge Posner also suggested that employer vicarious liability is more
appropriate for supervisory decisions affecting "a significant alteration
in the terms or conditions of his victim's employment" than for other
actions creating discriminatory working environments because higher
management's monitoring of the former decisions should be "relatively
easy."94 In his Ellerth opinion, Judge Flaum made a similar point,
asserting that while employers should be able to effectively control the
bartering of job perquisites for sex by supervisors, "it may not be
possible for employers to take the measures necessary to eradicate all
arguably offensive conduct from the workplace." 5
Although this argument has merit, it is incomplete. The argument has
merit because, as Judge Posner claimed, higher management realistically
can review for discriminatory intent supervisors' decisions or
recommendations to deny some formal job status or benefit, because
there generally is some system in place for reviewing whether these
decisions serve the company's business interests. Indeed, since the
standards of job performance upon which rational personnel decisions
could be based would not include the forms of discrimination proscribed
by Title VII, higher management, as part of its process of bureaucratic
control, normally should be able to ferret out suspicious personnel
decisions for further closer review.
By contrast, employees may create discriminatory hostile work
environments for their fellow employees surreptitiously, consciously
avoiding the attention of superiors who either are not involved or are
invested in the discriminatory abuse and thus might curtail it. Indeed, a
supervisor may be even more likely to act covertly than is an average co-
worker who lacks the use of a private office or other opportunities to
hide his or her dereliction. Thus, rather than merely adjusting its normal
review of formal personnel decisions, higher management often will
93. Judge Posner set forth a meaningful list of actions that a "reasonable"
employer would take to attempt to avert hostile work environment harassment: "institute
a tough policy, disseminate it, establish a procedure by which a worker can complain
without fear of retaliation ... respond promptly and effectively to any report of possible
harassment." Jansen, 123 F.3d at 513. But the list still leaves judges and juries with
difficult questions about what levels of "toughness," "dissemination," and "promptness
of response" are reasonable.
94. Id. at 512.
95. Id. at 501.
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have to engage in some higher level of monitoring to prevent supervisors
from creating discriminatory working environments.
However, this argument is incomplete. It fails to explain why
employers should not be given incentives, in the form of unqualified
vicarious liability for all discrimination, to determine what level of
additional monitoring is justified by the costs of the discrimination that
the monitoring could eliminate. As suggested above, if companies are
forced to internalize all the costs of discrimination, they not only can
compensate the victims from the many pockets of shareholders,
consumers, and employees, they can also determine an efficient level of
prevention."
Making a compelling policy-based argument against unqualified
employer vicarious liability for all Title VII violations thus requires an
explanation of why incentives for prevention should be placed on parties
other than company management. Such an explanation must rest on the
probability that these other parties could be induced to take action to
prevent a category of discrimination at lower costs than management
could.97 If this is the case, then forcing the other parties to bear the
burden of such costs will lead to more prevention of discrimination
(which is Title Vil's primary goal)" than will imposing these costs on
employers.
One might assume that the employee-perpetrators of discrimination in
all cases would be the lower-cost avoiders of that discrimination and that
imposing ultimate liability on them thus would lead to the greatest level
96. See supra text accompanying note 84. Perhaps a clear standard of absolute
employer liability also would encourage settlement and reduce litigation. If an
expansion of liability produced more litigation, however, the increase in litigation costs
would affect calculations concerning the efficiency of absolute employer liability. The
passage of Title VII, however, presumably reflects Congress's judgment that the
prevention of discrimination warrants any necessary costs of litigation.
97. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YAL L.L 1055 (1972); Guino CALABRESI, TBE COSTS OF AcCIDENTs (1970)
(especially chs. 7 and 10). Consider also Judge Posner's analysis:
So, if a class of activities can be identified in which activity-level changes by
potential injurers appear to be the most efficient method of accident
prevention, there is a strong argument for imposing strict liability on the
people engaged in those activities. And, conversely, if there is a class of
activities in which activity-level changes by potential victims are the most
efficient method of accident prevention, there is a strong argument for no
liability, as by applying the doctrine of assumption of risk to participation in
dangerous sports.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 177 (4th ed. 1992).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
of prevention. However, since Title VII has been interpreted not to
afford any action against the actual agents of discrimination," courts are
left with the choice of imposing the costs of discrimination either on the
victims or on the employers of the perpetrators. Thus, the critical policy
question is whether cases exist where victims could prevent
discrimination at lower cost than controlling management could. If so,
Justice Kennedy is accurate in his statement in Ellerth that "limiting
employer liability" would "serve Title VII's deterrent purpose" by
encouraging "employees to report harassing conduct."'00
The argument that a significant category of such cases exists must rest
on informational asymmetries between victims and uninvolved higher
management that would attempt to control the discrimination if they
knew it existed. Since few Title VII discrimination cases exist where the
victims have supervisory authority over the perpetrators,'1 the only
effective prevention recourse that victims normally have is reporting the
existence of the discrimination to those that do have such authority.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that there are very few cases
where imposing the costs of discrimination on its victims would induce
more effective prevention at lower costs than would imposing the costs
on employers. Many employees who create discriminatory
environments for their fellow employees do so covertly without making
any formal decision or recommendation that is reviewed by higher,
uninvolved management. In these cases, assuming that management is
in fact committed to preventing further discrimination, the key step to
effect that prevention is to make management aware of the
discrimination.'02 In many of these cases, the perceived costs to the
99. See supra note 6. Even if employees were personally liable under Title VII, if
employers were not also vicariously liable, the possibility that the perpetrating
employees could not pay a full judgment could lead to insufficient incentives to avoid
wrongdoing. See Sykes, supra note 45, at 567. See also Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics
of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984). As Professor Sykes also points out,
however, given the costs of indemnification actions, employer vicarious liability may
actually reduce incentives to avoid wrongdoing for personally liable employees who
cannot be effectively monitored and who do not care about their continuing relationships
with their employers. See Sykes, supra note 45, at 569-70.
100. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998). See also supra text
accompanying note 73.
101. Even in cases involving harassed supervisors, as in a case in which the
leadership of a black superior is sabotaged by white racist subordinates, the supervisor-
victim probably will need the assistance of his or her superior to arrest the ill treatment.
Cf. Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr. Auth., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1852 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd, 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991) (involving a pattern of male
conduct challenging a female's supervisory authority).
102. Through termination or other forms of discipline, employers can impose costs
on harassing employees who value the continuation of their employment relationships.
However, such an imposition of costs also depends on managements' awareness of the
harassment, and thus does not avoid the question of which liability rules can best
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victim of reporting may be lower than the costs of additional monitoring.
When this is true, requiring victims who do not report the harassment to
bear the costs of that harassment may provide an effective incentive for
prevention."
Justice Kennedy's assumption that limiting employer liability will
serve Title VII's deterrent purpose by encouraging employees to report
harassing conduct will not be true for all cases of covert hostile work
environment discrimination. Most importantly, it will not be true for
those cases in which victims believe that there is an appreciable risk of
incurring retaliation for reporting the discrimination. In most cases,
victims will fear that reporting will cause costly embarrassment, stress,
and possible social ostracism from fellow employees loyal to the
accused harasser. If, in addition to these costs, a harassment victim also
rationally fears retaliation from an employer, the victim surely is not the
lowest cost avoider. In such a case, increased prevention of future
discrimination can be accomplished by imposing a penalty on the
employer for not providing adequate assurances against retaliation.
Such a penalty encourages employers to bear the relatively low costs of
encourage such awareness.
103. Admittedly, there are factors that prevent knowing with certainty that where
the victim's reasonably perceived costs of reporting ("PCR") are less than the
employer's costs of monitoring ("CM"), requiring a nonreporting victim to bear his or
her own costs of harassment ("CHV") will lead to more potential prevention. The
complicating factors are the need for an employer to incur additional costs of
investigation and correction ("CIC") after an employee reports harassment and the fact
that harassment may impose costs on an employer ("CHEr") in addition to those borne
by its victim. Thus, where PCR < CM, we cannot be certain that PCR < CHV whenever
CM + CIC < CHV + CHEr. We have to make the further assumption that CHEr is
negligible, or even negative in those cases where employers compensate supervisors by
the indulgence of their harassment. If CHEr can be ignored, then if PCR < CM,
whenever CM + CIC < CHV, then PCR + CIC < CHV, and both PCR < CHV and CIC <
CHV, given the further realistic assumption that all unknowns are positive. Whenever
reporting is cheaper than further monitoring, there will be no cases where requiring a
victim to report in order to avoid bearing the costs of harassment win lead to less
prevention than imposing such costs on the employer to induce further monitoring and
correction. Bringing CHEr back into the equation weakens the case for qualifying
absolute employer liability with a victim reporting rule.
However, capping damages that can potentially be extracted from liable employers
under Title VII, see supra note 6, makes the case stronger for a victim reporting rule
because liable employers will be willing to spend less on monitoring to avoid liability
than victims will be willing to risk in reporting harassment. Therefore, in some cases,
even a victim who is not a lower cost avoider than an employer would be more likely to
be induced to prevent further discrimination.
giving such assurances."°4
This analysis supports the formulation of qualified employer vicarious
liability provided by Faragher and Ellerth. Employers should not be
able to avoid vicarious liability for discriminatory "tangible" or formal
personnel decisions because such decisions have been made available
for review and have been effectively passed on or acquiesced to by more
senior management. 5 By contrast, an employer should be able to avoid
104. This analysis does not rest on blaming the victims of hostile work environment
discrimination for the continuation of a course of conduct that may have been arrested by
disclosure to management. An unqualified employer vicarious liability rule may
encourage some discrimination victims and their lawyers to defer complaining until they
believe they have an airtight case to collect substantial damages and fees. In most cases,
however, victims who reasonably should report, but do not, probably do not report
simply because they lack sufficiently strong incentives to do so. Regardless of employer
liability rules, any victim has both the reporting incentive of avoiding the suffering of
future harassment and the reporting disincentive of resulting stress and embarrassment.
The Farragher-Ellerth affirmative defense simply assumes that by making recovery
dependent on the utilization of an effective reporting system, the balance will tip in favor
of encouraging significantly more complaints. Additionally, in many cases victims
confront collective action problems. When harassing discriminators target multiple
victims, any individual victim will not consider all the costs of continuing discrimination
when weighing the risks and benefits of disclosure. Where an employer, through an
adequate anti-retaliation policy, has made the risks of disclosure low, this problem is
addressed, albeit imperfectly, by forcing victims to bear at least the costs of the
discrimination against them if they do not act to help avoid the future discrimination of
others.
105. In a rigorous and thorough article otherwise generally supportive of the
Court's later holding in Faragher and Ellerth, Professor Verkerke concluded that
employers should not be vicariously liable for any discrimination-based employment
decision of their employees, no matter how tangible, significant, or formal, if the
discrimination is against the company's official policy and has not been reported by the
victim, and where the employer has offered a reasonable complaint procedure and
reasonable post-complaint relief. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REv. 273, 347-61 (1995). Professor Verkerke contended
that the case for qualifying employers' vicarious liability is stronger for garden variety
individual disparate treatment cases and for "quid pro quo" harassment cases than for
hostile work environment cases. Verkerke argued that the discriminatory motive in the
former cases is generally covert, while hostile work environments are generally created
in the open.
Verkerke's assumption that victims of discrimination in formal job actions are more
likely to be lower cost avoiders than the employer's management is almost certainly
incorrect for most cases. Management typically possesses information-such as the
comparative performance records of employees-necessary to determine whether a
discriminatory motive is likely. Victims, however, usually have no more than variant,
and sometimes flawed, sensitivities to ill treatment. Therefore, conditioning employer
liability for formal employment actions on victim complaints would encourage
employers to focus their investigatory resources on those cases most likely to result in
litigation, rather than on those cases in which a preliminary review suggests
discrimination. Victims whose ill treatment appears to fulfill the threats of sexual
predators do have special access to information that would be critical to establishing
discrimination, but the Court could not coherently carve out an exception for one specific
kind of discrimination from the general rule for disparate treatment cases. Furthermore,
even these sexual harassment cases ultimately turn on proof of the adequacy of an
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vicarious liability for workplace discriminatory harassment that has not
been formalized or otherwise reported, if and only if the employer has
taken reasonable steps to make the reporting of this harassment seem of
relatively low cost to the victim, and the victim has still failed to report
the offending conduct.
This analysis also explains why the Faragher-Ellerth qualified
vicarious liability analytical structure is better suited for Title VII hostile
work environment cases than the negligence standard it eclipses.
Consider again the four reasons why Title VII plaintiffs should welcome
the Faragher-Ellerth approach as an alternative to negligence analysis.
First, the policy analysis presented above explains why it is sensible to
place on employers the burden of proving the adequacy of their own
preventive and corrective measures (as well as the unreasonable
inadequacy of the response of employee victims), rather than having the
victims carry the burden of proving employer negligence. The analysis
explains why there should be a presumption of employer liability not
only because employers are better risk bearers of the costs of
discrimination, but also because they generally are lower cost avoiders
of discriminatory harassment than are the victimized employees-except
in those instances where the victims have failed to take advantage of low
cost opportunities to avert the harassment. Given such a presumption,
and taking into account management's superior knowledge of its own
efforts to curtail discrimination, shifting the burden of proof through the
device of an affirmative defense seems attractive.
Second, the above policy analysis also makes a compelling case for
the elimination of any obligation on the part of an employee who has
proven that he or she has been significantly affected by discriminatory
harassment, also to prove that the harassment would have been avoided
by the employer's implementation of an adequate prevention scheme.
As explained above,' under a negligence theory, a victim must prove
that the negligence of which he or she complains (in this context,
management's failure to reasonably take steps to avoid harassment)
caused his or her injury. By contrast, a liability theory that is based on
cost internalization and risk spreading does not make judgments about
what should have been done to avoid injury, and thus requires no causal
connection between reasonable action and injury avoidance. Instead, if
employer's justification for the adverse action, rather than on the existence of the threat.
See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 835-38 (1991).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
the employer's operation provided the opportunities for the harassment,
it should internalize and bear the costs of such harassment, unless the
victim's failure to take low cost avoidance steps indicates that the victim
should bear the costs as an incentive for future prevention.
Third, the analysis confirms that employers that do not take adequate
preventive and corrective measures against discriminatory harassment
should pay the costs of such harassment, not only to serve the
remediation goal of Title VII, but also as the most effective incentive for
the prevention of future discrimination. Thus, no questions should be
raised about employer liability for compensatory or punitive damages, as
would be raised under a theory that rests on employers being held liable
for their managers' negligence rather than for their supervisors'
intentional discrimination. 107
Finally, the analysis of this article justifies both prongs of the
Faragher and Ellerth affirmative defense, requiring not only proof of the
employer's own reasonable care, but also proof that the plaintiff
"unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer.""' Proof that an employer took
all steps that might be adequate in the average case to avoid
discriminatory harassment does not establish that the harassment victim
would have been the lower cost avoider in the particular case. To
establish the latter, the employer would have to examine the particular
situation of the victim and show that the victim acted unreasonably in
failing to take opportunities to avoid harm.
For instance, consider a female filing clerk in a brokerage office who
is being continually ogled, propositioned, and sexually demeaned
(though not physically threatened) by the firm's leading sales producer.
If the firm has a well publicized and generally reasonable policy against
harassment, including a complaint procedure that enables targets to
report to management not involved in the harassment and that gives
assurances against retaliation, is it clear that the clerk is the lowest cost
avoider in her particular case? Might she reasonably believe that the
firm's officers would rather replace a filing clerk than a star salesman
and therefore that her job might be in jeopardy were she to complain?"°
107. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
108. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2279 (1998); Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
109. The reasonableness of the clerk's failure to utilize the firm's complaint
procedure would be even more clear if the harasser were the firm's president. Both
Ellerth and Faragher seem to confirm absolute employer vicarious liability in cases of
harassment by senior officers, without consideration of the reasonableness of the
employer's anti-harassment policy or of the reasonableness of the victim's response to
that policy. In Ellerth Justice Kennedy referred to cases "where the agent's high rank in
the company makes him or her the employer's alter ego." Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267. In
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In other words, an anti-harassment policy and reporting system that
might give adequate assurances in the average case, might not do so in
some situations. If the victimized plaintiff acted reasonably in failing to
utilize the system, the special justification articulated above for
imposing costs on the victim is not persuasive.
Consider next a case where an employee does take advantage of
reasonable complaint procedures, and the employer conducts an
investigation that results in a stalemate of uncorroborated accusations
and denials, rather than in the punishment of the accused harasser. The
employer should be liable to the employee for any actionable harassment
that the employee can prove in Title VII litigation regardless of the
reasonableness of the employer's internal investigation."' Where
Faragher Justice Souter described Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993),
in which "the individual charged with creating the abusive atmosphere was the president
of the corporate employer, who was indisputably within that class of an employer's
organization's officials who may be treated as the organization's proxy." Faragher, 118
S. Ct. at 2284 (citing Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992);
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634-35 & n.11 (2d Cir. 1997); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983)) (all supporting automatic employer liability where the
perpetrator is an owner or high officer).
110. Of course, the more comprehensive and effective an employer's anti-
harassment policy, the less likely that there will be many cases where a victim who fails
to report cannot be identified as the lower cost avoider of the injuries incurred. For
instance, an anti-harassment policy could promise preliminary confidential investigations
that would protect the identity of the accuser. It could also promise close review of the
exercise of any authority that the alleged harasser has over the accuser. Moreover, it
could promise, based on sufficiently clear warnings and definitions of what the employer
would not tolerate, termination of this authority if the allegations are substantiated.
However, particularly in light of the inevitable stress and embarrassment suffered by
reporting victims, there may be cases, such as the case described in the text of this
article, where a fact finder may determine that a victim reasonably declined to report
some types of harassment against particular perpetrators regardless of the employer's
policy.
111. This point is clarified in Faragher and Ellerth by the Court's reliance on an
"aided-by-agency-relation" theory, separate from an "apparent authority" theory, for its
qualified employer vicarious liability standard. Apparent authority is dependent upon
the reasonable belief of an affected party that the principal accepts the agent's authority
to engage in particular acts. See W. EDWARD SELL, AGENCY 25-26 (1975). A strong,
well promulgated anti-harassment policy would negate such a belief. "When employees
know that recourse is available, they cannot reasonably believe that a harassing work
environment is authorized or condoned by the employer." See EEOC Policy Guidance,
supra note 56, at 405:6697. For example, in Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir.
1995), a supervisor used his authority to order a subordinate to an isolated warehouse
where he allegedly carried out a rape, but the court held the employer could not be
vicariously liable under either an apparent authority or a negligence theory because of
the employer's strong anti-harassment policy and its reasonable investigation.
By contrast, a supervisor's harassment of a subordinate employee might be aided by
employee victims take advantage of low cost prevention opportunities,
employers should be viewed as lower cost avoiders of discriminatory
harassment (as well as the superior spreader or insurer of the costs of
discrimination) whether or not they can be judged guilty of negligent or
unreasonable prevention and correction efforts."
2
Employers might argue that if reasonable investigations do not
insulate them from liability, they will not conduct such investigations for
fear of providing employees with the evidence to advance a law suit
against them."' However, there are reasons to believe that thorough
investigations of harassment allegations usually will be in the interest of
employers even in the absence of a rule providing complete insulation
from liability. First, an investigation can identify a delinquent
supervisor who might otherwise engage in even more costly harassment
against old or new victims in the future. Second, a timely investigation
the authority he derives from his agency relationship with the employer regardless of any
anti-harassment policy. For example, in Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437
(10th Cir. 1997), the court held an employer liable under an "aided-by-an-agency-
relation" standard for a supervisor's harassment of a subordinate employee after ordering
her to accompany him to an isolated mine.
112. Imposing employer liability in a case where a reasonable investigation has not
resulted in a clear resolution of the validity of the charges might encourage unfair
treatment of unjustly accused supervisors, who generally do not have as effective
countervailing causes of action for unjust discharge. See, e.g., Cotran v. Rollins Hudig
Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998) (employer must only act in good faith after an
appropriate investigation with reasonable grounds for believing manager engaged in
misconduct). In most cases, however, employers can limit their liability even after
making inconclusive findings by simply ensuring that an accused and his accuser no
longer have contact at work.
113. Cf. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (suggesting that corporate criminal liability may
discourage some corporate investigation of crime because of fear of increased exposure
to liability). Professor Verkerke relied on Professor Arlen's article to help advance his
argument that employer liability for discrimination-based formal employment actions
should be conditioned on the victim reporting his or her suspicion of discrimination to
the employer. See supra note 105. It is difficult to believe, however, that the rule of
absolute employer liability for discriminatory formal employment decisions discourages
managerial review of such decisions for discriminatory bias. If management could
predict which particular employment actions would result in lawsuits, perhaps some
would attempt to bias their review of these decisions to help produce a defense; but since
management cannot make such predictions, they must decide on the basis of the average
case whether to attempt to avoid further actionable discrimination through good faith,
unbiased reviews. Deciding to conduct such reviews should not be difficult. On the one
hand, management understands that a discriminator that is not uncovered is likely to
engage in further discrimination that will expose the employer to further liability. On the
other hand, in the average formal employment decision discrimination case, if a review
finds bias, the decision can be overturned before its victim suffers any significant harm
for which the employer could be held liable; and if bias is not found, the review would
not provide assistance to a Title VII plaintiff. Corporate investigators have incentives to
compromise their investigations only in unusual cases where they find evidence of guilt,
but are convinced of innocence.
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and prompt corrective action can often provide effective insulation from
a lawsuit by the complaining employee by arresting the harassment
before it becomes sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to "create an
abusive working environment."' 4 If the harassment has already reached
that level because of the failure of the victim to complain earlier, the
employer, under the Court's standard as explained below,"5 should be
able to escape liability for any harassment about which the plaintiff did
not promptly complain.
Consider finally the third class of cases noted above for which an
employer's reasonable prevention and corrective actions should not
insulate it from liability absent proof that the employee victim did not
reasonably take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities.
This class of cases involves a situation where an employee is victimized
by a sudden, severe act of discrimination, such as a sexual assault, that
the victim could not anticipate. In such a case, an employer with an
effective anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure could be
exposed to significant liability under the Court's standard, even after
taking prompt action to prevent further harassment in response to a
timely complaint from an employee victim. Timely complaints and
immediate, effective corrective responses by employers cannot change
what has already occurred. However, even in those situations, it seems
unlikely that an employer could reduce the risk of liability by avoiding a
thorough investigation that could lead to immediate termination of a
guilty supervisor. A victim willing to invoke governmental regulatory
processes will be able to provide evidence of the harassment through
personal testimony. Thus, an employer would actively have to cover-up
the assault, and any attempt at a cover-up, along with the resulting
continued employment of the supervisor, could lead to the aggravation
of damages against the immediate victim, as well as against other
potential victims."
6
Therefore, if a claim based on a single assault is to be thwarted, it
114. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
115. See infra text accompanying notes 145-146.
116. Similarly, after Farragher and Ellerth, an employer would be foolhardy to
calculate that it could avoid additional liability by having no effective anti-harassment
policy in order to avoid stirring up additional complaints, rather than by trying to avert
harassment through an effective policy. The affirmative defense offered by the Court's
decisions surely will prevent increased liability for the conscientious employer, as
opposed to the recalcitrant employer, who attempts to repress employee consciousness of
the harassment cause of action.
should be thwarted because it is considered not to state a cause of action
under Title VII,"7 not because the employer has demonstrated reasonable
care, without also demonstrating that the victim unreasonably failed to
take advantage of opportunities to avoid the assault."' Where the
employer cannot make the latter demonstration, the employer should be
forced to bear the costs of discrimination. Thus, the employer should
consider the costs of discrimination against the costs of any further
preventive action, such as screening tests, training, and monitoring.
Even when the court cannot determine that such steps would be cost
efficient and thus reasonable for the employer, it can determine that the
employer, rather than the victim, at least has the ability to take additional
steps the costs of which can be weighed against the costs of
harassment."9
In sum, a strong policy argument can be made in favor of the choice
117. An argument that a single sexual assault is not actionable sex discrimination
under Title VII might reason as follows: if the perpetrator is immediately removed from
his job, any physical or psychological harms would arise from the assault itself rather
than from a hostile or abusive working environment. It is only where the perpetrator is
allowed to continue to work in the same environment that his assault, or other
harassment, creates inferior working conditions based on the victim's sex.
A similar analysis could apply to harassment that takes place outside the workplace
and working hours. Outside harassment itself does not affect the conditions of
employment of the victim and therefore should not be actionable. However, a victim's
working conditions are affected if the victim continues to have to serve under the
supervision of an extra-work harasser. Therefore, if the victim reports to the victim's
employer an assault by a supervisor in a private apartment, the employer would have an
obligation to take prompt corrective action to avoid the victim having to suffer a
discriminatory work environment caused by the memory of the traumatic experience
with the supervisor.
118. Compare the Eighth Circuit's use of a negligence standard in Todd v. Ortho
Biotech, Inc., 138 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 1998), to reject employer liability for an isolated
rape, in light of the employer's reasonable corrective response.
119. It is important to remember that prevention of discrimination, not achievement
of some theoretical efficient level of monitoring, is the primary goal of Title VII. Some
might argue that hiring discrimination would actually be encouraged by any rule that
does not provide absolute insulation from liability for employers that take effective
preventive and corrective action. This argument constitutes a variation on the theme
developed by some commentators that any form of regulation of discrimination after
hiring makes the hiring of those who are most likely to bring discrimination actions more
costly. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why
Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1487
(1996); John J. Donohue it & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983 (1991). However, this theme has never influenced
Congress in its efforts to provide protection from post-hiring, as well as pre-hiring
discrimination. Congress has chosen to prohibit both, and the Court's interpretation of
the meaning of "agent" in the statute should advance, rather than reject, that choice.
Furthermore, an equally compelling-though equally speculative-argument can be
made that any rule of absolute employer liability for supervisory discriminatory
harassment will provide a marginal incentive for the hiring and promotion of minorities
and women who are less likely to engage in such harassment.
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made by the Court in Faragher and Ellerth to formulate a qualified
employer vicarious liability standard and to reject requiring plaintiffs to
prove employer negligence in order to recover against employers for
supervisory discriminatory harassment. Furthermore, as will be
explained in Part IV of this article, this policy structure can assist courts
in deciding difficult issues that the Faragher-Ellerth standard may
present for future cases.
IV. QUESTIONS IN THE WAKE OF FARAGHER AND ELLERTH
As suggested above, this article will conclude by addressing five
issues that raise policy concerns in the wake of Faragher and Ellerth.
The first issue involves defining when employers cannot assert the
affirmative defense against liability for the discriminatory actions of
their supervisors because the actions are "tangible." What exactly
constitutes a "tangible" employment action?
Both Faragher and Ellerth offer some guidance for defining the term
in this context. The one paragraph that is common to both opinions, and
which contains the statement of the holding in each,' concludes by
stating that "[n]o affirmative defense is available, however, when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action,
such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment."'' Faragher
offers little more, noting only that employer liability for a supervisor's
discrimination has been automatic where there have been "tangible
results, like hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, and work
assignment.""
The Ellerth decision addresses the issue at greater length by first
looking to whether the discriminatory action had a "significant" impact
on the victim's employment status. It states that "[a] tangible
employment action constitutes a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits. ' ' Ellerth then cites, with apparent approval, several
cases that emphasize the importance of the impact being "significant,"
including two cases holding that "demotion without change in pay,
120. See supra text accompanying note 11.
121. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998); Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257,2270 (1998).
122. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at2284.
123. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at2268.
benefits, duties, or prestige"'" and reassignment to more inconvenient
job'2n are insufficiently significant."n
Somewhat discordantly, the next paragraph of the Ellerth opinion
stresses that tangible employment actions are actions "that fall within the
special province of the supervisor" that only a person such as a
supervisor can effect, being "empowered by the company as a distinct
class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees
under his or her control."' 27 Finally, yet a third paragraph asserts that
"[a] tangible employment decision requires an official act of the
enterprise, a company act. The decision in most cases is documented in
official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level
supervisors. ' '
Clearly the Justices intended "tangible" employment actions to
encompass any discrimination-based discharges or refusals to hire.
Presumably, any discrimination-based decision on an employee's level
of compensation would also be "tangible."'129 However, in ight of the
Ellerth opinion, are all discrimination-based demotions or refusals to
promote encompassed? Are all discriminatory work assignments or all
disciplinary actions?
Assume, for instance, that Faragher's primary supervisor had
exercised his delegated authority to assign her regularly to an isolated,
exposed, and dangerous beach outpost, and had done so either because
he did not like having female guards under his authority or because she
had refused his sexual advances. Would the City of Boca Raton have
been able to assert an affirmative defense to its being liable for
Faragher's discrimination-based work assignments? Should it matter
124. Id. at 2269 (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887
(6th Cir. 1996)).
125. Id. at 2269 (citing Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382
(8th Cir. 1994)).
126. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has already relied on this part of the
Ellerth opinion in ruling that a supervisor's assignment of extra work to a harassment
victim did not constitute "tangible employment action" because, in the court's view, such
an assignment was not "significant." Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir.
1998).
127. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
128. Id.
129. In the sexual harassment context, however, decisions not to grant some job
benefit such as a pay increase or a general promotion that would have been granted had
the harassment target been willing to grant sexual favors to the harasser presumably are
not discrimination-based tangible employment actions if the benefit would not have been
given to a member of the opposite sex, or a nontargeted member of the same sex, for the
same work performance. The sexual propositions used to attempt to bribe the target,
however, presumably could create a discriminatory hostile work environment for which
the employer could be liable if it could not establish the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative
defense.
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whether the formal duties are different at her unattractive beach posting
than at others? Ellerth seems to point in different directions. On the one
hand, the supervisor is "empowered" by the city to formulate work
assignments like the ones that disadvantaged Faragher. On the other
hand, the assignments are not official "company acts" approved by the
central office of the city's recreation department, and may not even have
been reported to any superior of the assigning supervisor.
The policy analysis offered in the previous section clarifies how the
"tangible" employment action line should be delineated. The critical
consideration should be whether the discriminating supervisor has
recorded or reported his discriminatory action (though not, of course, his
discriminatory motivation) so that it is readily available for review. The
above analysis assumes that employers are lower cost avoiders of
discriminatory actions that are overt and thus subject to review;
employee victims may be lower cost avoiders only of covert actions that
have not been reported to management. Thus, while the "significance"
to Faragher of the discriminatory work assignments described in the
hypothetical is relevant to the level of damages that she can collect under
Title VII, it should not determine whether Boca Raton should be able to
assert an affirmative defense against its liability for whatever damages
would remedy her loss.t O
The "recorded or reported" test could be adopted as a variation on one
of Justice Kennedy's themes. It would cover all "company acts" that
130. The significance of the impact on Faragher of the discriminatory work
assignments arguably should be relevant to whether the discrimination against her was
sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to create an actionable discriminatory working
environment under Title VII. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
The Ellerth opinion, however, states that
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a
refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that
the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions
of employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment
preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct
must be severe or pervasive.
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265. This explanation constitutes an effort to retain the relevance
of the old distinction between "hostile work environment" and "quid pro quo" sexual
harassment, and perhaps explains why Justice Kennedy in Ellerth also attempts to
qualify "tangible" employment actions with the additional "significant" adjective.
Rather than defining those employment actions not permitting an affirmative defense
with the same language used to define employment actions for which no level of
significance of impact is required, the Court could simply require that the impact of any
discrimination be significant to be actionable, whether or not the discrimination imposes
automatic liability on the employer.
receive the imprimatur of the firm. Even a company president's direct
discharge of a subordinate is an official act available for review by the
firm's Board of Directors. 3 ' However, the test would not necessarily
cover a supervisor's assignment of unattractive work, such as the
isolated beach postings in the hypothetical.3 2 In such a case, a court
would have to determine that the postings were reported or recorded for
the potential review of the supervisor's superiors before denying the
Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense.'33
The policy analysis in this article also addresses one of the central
issues presented by the Faragher-Ellerth holding for those cases of
discrimination that do not involve tangible employment actions. In such
cases courts often will have to determine what deficiencies in the
opportunities for preventive or corrective action provided by an
employer would justify a victim not taking advantage of those
opportunities.
This question is not directly answered by the Faragher and Ellerth
opinions. The language common to both decisions does not articulate
any set criteria for all cases. It allows only that "the need for a stated
[anti-harassment] policy suitable to the employment circumstances may
appropriately be addressed in any case" and that a demonstration of
"unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer.., will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden
under the second element of the defense.""' The Court's application of
its holding to the extreme facts of the Faragher case provides only
somewhat more illumination. The Court decided that it need not remand
to provide the city an opportunity to assert its affirmative defense
because the city "entirely failed to disseminate its policy" among the
widely dispersed beach employees and otherwise "made no attempt to
keep track of the conduct of supervisors" like those who were found to
have harassed Faragher.'3' Furthermore, "the City's policy did not
include any assurance that the harassing supervisors could be bypassed
131. In any event, the president, as a high ranking officer of the firm, would be
treated as the firm's alter ego for purposes of Title VII agency law. See supra note 109.
132. A company with a less rationalized management system may escape
responsibility for some discriminatory harassment for which a better structured company
would be liable. However, this is unlikely to provide a significant incentive for a
company to relax its reporting requirements on middle managers.
133. However, even if the beach postings were not officially reported or recorded,
and the city could assert an affirmative defense, the fact that the postings resulted in
Faragher always occupying an unattractive seat on a public beach open to the inspection
of city officials would be relevant to the city's ability to prove that the officials had
"exercised reasonable care" in preventing the discrimination against her. The costs of
monitoring some unreported decisions may be lower than the costs of victim reporting.
134. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
135. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. 2293.
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in registering complaints."'36
The policy analysis set forth in this article suggests that courts should
require an employer to establish the adequacy of the employer's
assurances that no retaliation will arise against an employee who
complains of sexual harassment or some other form of Title VII-
proscribed discrimination. As argued above, the reason that victims may
not be the lowest-cost injury avoiders in some circumstances is that the
victims' reasonable calculation of the costs of reporting, especially the
potential costs of retaliation, may be greater than the costs to employers
of further monitoring.' 3 Only when an employer proves that it has
provided adequate assurances against retaliation should it be able to
demonstrate the sufficient likelihood that forcing a plaintiff to bear the
costs of the plaintiff's own victimization will discourage enough further
harassment to warrant the employer's escaping an obligation to remedy
and internalize the cost of this harassment.
Clearly, the mere existence of a formal company policy against
retaliation should not be sufficient to avert employer liability. As the
Court recognized in Meritor,'38 victims cannot be expected to report their
complaints to the same supervisor or supervisors against whom the
harassment charges are pressed; the complaint or reporting process must
provide alternative channels to bypass particular supervisors.
Additionally, employers should promise and provide close review of any
personnel decisions involving complainants, and, where feasible,
conduct preliminary confidential investigations that do not unnecessarily
identify complainarfis until there is sufficient evidence to suspend the
accused harasser's supervisory authority in the absence of a convincing
exculpatory response. In any event, employers should remove the
authority that any proven discriminators have over their accusers. As
suggested above, the more valuable the accused discriminator is to the
firm relative to the complainant, the more critical these precautionary
measures will be. And, as also suggested above, there may be cases




137. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
138. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57,73 (1986).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10. Of course no formal policy, even
one that comprehensively addresses retaliation threats, should satisfy an employer's duty
under the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense if that policy is not effectively
implemented. Employees understand that their employers' real policies are reflected in
This focus on requiring employers to protect discrimination
complainants from retaliation accords with the Faragher and Ellerth
rationale for adopting a qualified vicarious liability standard for
supervisory harassment cases. Justice Kennedy in Ellerth stressed the
"particular threatening character" of a "supervisor's power and
authority" over harassment victims in his explanation of how the agency
relation aids supervisors in the commission of discriminatory
harassment."4 Presumably, Justice Kennedy was referring to the threat
of the use of that power and authority against a target who resists or
reports. Justice Souter in Faragher was more express, stating that the
supervisor's harassment is aided by his agency relation at least in part
because "the victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing
the whistle on a superior.' 41 Therefore, to suspend the basis for
vicarious liability, an employer should be required to show that it has
successfully neutralized these risks for a reasonable victim of
harassment.
4 1
A third important question raised by the joint holding of the Faragher
and Ellerth decisions concerns whether a victim's failure to report earlier
harassment pursuant to an employer's reasonable complaint system
should prevent the victim from recovering for later harassment the
victim did report. This question is important because harassment
victims often delay complaints, even having knowledge of their
employers' strong anti-harassment policies and prevention and
corrective systems. Victims delay their complaints not only to avoid
possible retaliation or at least ostracism and embarrassment, but also to
prove that they can deal with friction. They choose not to unnecessarily
polarize the individuals in their workplaces. Should such delay be
discouraged by denying employees recovery for later harassment that
they did promptly report on the ground that this harassment could have
been avoided had the employees taken advantage of reasonable
opportunities to complain of earlier harassment?' 3
their actions rather than in their words.
140. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
141. Faragher, 118S. Ct. at2291.
142. Thus Ellerth on remand should have a chance to explain why she did not
complain about her harassment to Burlington's management before resigning. Ellerth
may stress that she had been recently employed in an entry level position and that her
claim was against the vice president of marketing in the mattress-fabric division of
Burlington, a man she could assume the company would want to retain and protect. She
might also emphasize, if true, that the company's anti-harassment policy as presented in
its employee handbook did not include any assurances against retaliation, or any
explanations of how those alleging harassment would be protected. Finally, Ellerth
should be able to set forth any other evidence that led her reasonably to believe that the
firm allowed some level of harassment, notwithstanding its formal policy.
143. The lower court decisions since Faragher and Ellerth suggest that recovery for
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Under this article's policy analysis, arguments can be made that the
failure to invoke an employer's reasonable preventive and corrective
processes should preclude recovery against the employer for any
avoidable later harassment. An early complaint might seem to be the
least costly step that could have been taken to prevent further
harassment. In addition, one might argue that a harassment victim who
may refuse to take into account the risk of a supervisor's future
harassment of other employees when deciding whether to report, ought
at least to be required to take into account the full non-reimbursable
costs of his or her own potential future victimization.
Such arguments, however, do not account for the additional costs of
encouraging complaints about harassment, or about arguable
harassment, or even about annoying comments that employee victims
feel they can handle without employer assistance. Encouraging
complaints in anticipation of future escalated harassment that might
never occur would result in unnecessary and costly investigations,
polarized workplaces, and embarrassed and ostracized complainants.
Precluding recovery for future harassment to employees who do not
complain about what they view as manageable mistreatment from their
supervisors also would result in an aggravation of the anxiety of victims
caught between fears of retaliation and uncertainties about whether their
treatment is sufficiently serious to require reporting.
At the least, courts should not preclude recovery for a victim's failure
to report any treatment that is itself not clearly severe or pervasive
enough to be actionable under Title VII. " Courts also should not
preclude recovery for escalated levels of harassment simply because the
plaintiffs were able to accept a lower level of harassment without
initiating an adversarial investigation.' 45 In order to provide incentives
harassment reported later should be denied if a court or fact finder views the victim's
failure to report the harassment earlier as unreasonable. See Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp.,
156 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 1998); Corcoran v. Shoney's Colonial, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 601
(W.D. Va. 1998); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
144. Precluding recovery for any earlier failure to report would be particularly
draconian. A victim reporting harassment that she does not reasonably believe is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable under Title VII may not be protected
from retaliation under section 704 of Title VII. See Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., 157 F.3d
824 (1lth Cir. 1998).
145. Inasmuch as harassment inevitably becomes more severe as it becomes more
frequent and pervasive, this in effect means that courts should never assert a victim's
failure to report earlier harassment as a reason to preclude recovery for later harassment
that is promptly reported.
for victim reporting (and thereby employer prevention) of harassment
even before it becomes severe and actionable, victims simply should not
be able to recover from employers for any damages caused only by acts
of harassment that were not reported in a timely fashion. For instance, if
a supervisor had made earlier verbal sexual attacks on a victim, the
victim's failure to report the attacks should insulate the employer from
liability for only the verbal attacks, not for a later and reported sexual
assault. If the last and only promptly reported incident of harassment is
limited to another (perhaps more offensive) verbal attack, the victim's
recovery would probably be minimal."4
The fourth question raised by the joint holding of the Faragher and
Ellerth decisions is whether a victim's failure to take reasonable steps to
avoid or mitigate particular harassment should qualify the liability of
even a negligent employer for that particular harassment. Should an
employee who fails to utilize a fair and effective reporting system for
complaining about harassment be able to recover from an employer
whose senior managers knew or should have known of the harassment
even without the employee's complaint? The answer is not fully clear.
On the one hand, an employee's failure to mitigate may seem irrelevant
in the situation where an employer is negligent. Faragher's and
Ellerth's common holding expresses the affirmative defense in the
conjunctive, stating that the defense has two "necessary" elements; the
Court connects the elements with the word "and" rather than "or". 47
On the other hand, a strong argument can be made that employer
vicarious liability should be limited, though not eliminated, by proof of
only the second element of the affirmative defense, the victim's
unreasonable failure to take advantage of preventive or corrective
opportunities. This view is suggested by the citation in each opinion of
the "avoidable consequences doctrine" from the law of damages as a
doctrinal rationale for consideration of the employee victim's avoidance
efforts as the second element of the defense.', This doctrine as applied
would limit an employer's liability for its failure to take adequate
corrective or preventive measures where the employee victim
nonetheless reasonably could have mitigated the harassment by, for
example, accepting a transfer to a different department. Justice Souter in
Faragher makes this application expressly: "if damages could
146. Acts of harassment that were not reported should be considered by the courts
when determining whether the harassment had reached a level that was sufficiently
pervasive to be actionable, but they should not be a basis for recovery.
147. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. Justice Souter's
preliminary statement of the affirmative defense in Faragher also uses the conjunctive"and." See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292.
148. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
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reasonably have been mitigated no award against a liable employer
should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts could have
avoided.
, 49
This limitation is also supported by the policy analysis presented in
this article. Victims should have incentives to take relatively low cost
steps to report and otherwise avoid discriminatory harassment even
where that harassment has been caused in part by the employer's
negligence. Consider, for instance, a hypothetical case in which the
chief operating officer of a firm inadvertently discovers, without
anyone's knowledge, that one of the firm's supervisors (and the officer's
subordinate) has been sexually harassing one of the supervisor's
subordinates. Assume that the supervisor is one of the officer's best
friends and that the officer takes no action to arrest the harassment.
Assume also, however, that the firm has a strong and effective anti-
harassment policy that directs complaints to a special personnel officer
and that the victim knows this policy has been used as the basis for the
dismissal of another supervisor involved in similar harassment. The
officer's failure to ensure that adequate corrective and preventive
measures are taken to stop the harassment should prevent the employer
from demonstrating the first element of its affirmative defense and thus
should render the employer liable for the supervisor's harassment. Since
the victim probably could have taken advantage of the effective anti-
harassment system at a relatively lower cost, however, her failure to do
so should prevent her from collecting damages for any harassment that
her use of that system could have prevented.5
Probably the most important part of the Title VII agency question not
fully resolved by the Faragher and Ellerth decisions concerns the
149. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at2292.
150. The approach to this problem can be based on the model of comparative
negligence. A negligent employer should not be liable for harassment that a negligent
victim could have avoided at a lower cost. However, the qualification made in the text
should be reiterated. See supra notes 144-146. Employees should not be penalized for
accepting one level of harassment by being prevented from recovering for further
harassment; they simply should not be able to recover for the unreported harassment.
Thus, using the example in the text, if the subordinate suffers nine unreported instances
of harassment before she utilizes the complaint procedure after a tenth incident, she
should be able to recover for damages resulting from the tenth (and any subsequent)
incident, even though this tenth incident may have been avoided by an earlier complaint.
The first nine incidents should be considered in determining whether the harassment was
sufficiently severe and pervasive to be actionable, but not in determining the extent of
the employer's liability.
treatment of employer liability for discriminatory abusive working
environments created by the victims' nonsupervisory co-workers.
Should the affirmative defense/qualified vicarious liability approach of
these decisions also be applied to discriminatory harassment by co-
workers?
Both opinions send strong signals that the Court does not intend to
jettison the lower courts' current negligence standard for such cases.
Justice Souter's opinion in Faragher asserts as a reason for the rejection
of a "scope of authority" doctrinal rationale for vicarious liability for
supervisory harassment the likelihood that its adoption would lead to the
erosion of the negligence standard for co-worker harassment that has
commanded a "unanimity of views" in the lower courts."' Justice
Kennedy's Ellerth opinion similarly expresses concern that a broad
interpretation of the "aided-by-agency-relation" doctrine that recognized
how "[p]roximity and regular contact may afford a captive pool of
potential victims" for co-worker as well as supervisory harassment could
lead to employer vicarious liability for the former as well as the latter.52
Finally, Justice Souter's opinion takes pains to distinguish supervisory
from co-worker discriminatory harassment under the "aided-by-agency-
relation" doctrinal rationale, contending that "an employee generally
cannot check a supervisor's abusive conduct the same way that she
might deal with abuse from a co-worker" and that "the employer has a
greater opportunity to guard against misconduct by supervisors than by
common workers."'53
Despite the Justices' efforts, the distinction between co-worker and
supervisory discriminatory harassment for purposes of employer
vicarious liability is not convincing. The prevention-based cost
internalization, as well as the remediation arguments for employer
liability for co-worker discriminatory harassment, are as strong as those
for employer liability for supervisory harassment. An employer's
operation is as much a necessary and foreseeable cause of the former as
of the latter.'" Most importantly, in the absence of an adequate and
151. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2289. The lower court opinions decided after
Faragher and Ellerth have continued to assume that a negligence standard applies for
employer liability in co-worker harassment cases. See, e.g., Williamson v. Houston, 148
F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 1998).
152. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
153. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at2291.
154. Professor Sykes, defending the distinction between co-worker and supervisory
harassment for purposes of vicarious liability, disagrees. See Sykes, supra note 45, at
608. Focusing on acts of sexual harassment, he assumed that those who are "prone" to
engage in such acts may be as likely to do so regardless of employment status. This
assumption ignores the reality that employment rules typically force employees to work
closely with other workers, thus providing the opportunity for co-worker discrimination.
More importantly, much discriminatory harassment-including much sexual
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unused reporting system, an employer is as likely to be the lower cost
avoider of co-worker harassment as of supervisory harassment.
It makes no difference either to the Civil Rights Act's discrimination
prevention or to its complementary remediation goal that it may be
easier for most employers to guard against the misbehavior of a limited
number of screened and trained supervisors than against the misbehavior
of the average employee.5" As explained above, the most compelling
argument that employer vicarious liability will encourage the prevention
of future discrimination is not based on penalizing employers who have
been judged to have acted "unreasonably" by engaging in less
prevention than warranted by the reasonably foreseeable costs of
discrimination, but rather on providing employers the proper incentives
to calculate efficient levels of prevention.1 6 Furthermore, the fact that
preventing co-worker harassment might be more difficult than
preventing supervisory harassment does not mean that employers are
any less superior risk spreaders and anticipators for the costs of the
former.
157
It might be argued that an effective reporting system is necessary for
supervisory harassment because, as Justice Souter stresses, supervisors,
unlike co-workers, generally possess authority to reward and penalize
subordinates and can thereby discourage harassment victims'
whistleblowing.'58 However, as the above described hypothetical case of
the star salesman and filing clerk illustrates,'59 harassment victims may
also rationally fear retaliation from a management that is not involved in
harassment--occurs not to gain something such as sexual favors but to assert or maintain
power over the employment turf. See Schultz, supra note 18. Therefore, such
harassment would not occur away from this turf.
155. This premise, as embraced by Justice Souter may be untrue for some forms of
discriminatory harassment. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291. For example, it may be
easier for employers to discover the average employee's sexual harassment of a fellow
employee than to discover sexual harassment by supervisors who have the authority and
opportunity to engage in isolated encounters with their victims in private locations such
as offices. Furthermore, the premise does not distinguish between supervisors with
authority over their victims, who are expressly covered by the Faragher-Ellerth holding,
and supervisors without such direct authority, who are not covered. Justice Souter's
premise, even if cogent, would support imposing vicarious liability on employers for all
the harassment of their supposedly more thoroughly screened supervisors, regardless of
whether that harassment victimized someone under the particular harasser's authority.
156. See supra text accompanying note 84.
157. See supra text accompanying note 90.
158. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
159. See supra text accompanying note 109.
or approving of the harassment, but that will acquiesce to the harassment
for the purpose of continuing a profitable operation. The filing clerk, for
instance, may experience the same level of fear whether or not the star
salesman has authority to effect or even recommend her discharge. '6°
Even an employee harassed by a group of co-workers at her own job
level may rationally fear retaliation from a management that has not
effectively promulgated a strict anti-harassment policy.
16'
Of course, the kind of anti-harassment policy and reporting system
that should be adequate to encourage rational victims to report
harassment by their peers need not be the same as that necessary to
encourage accusations against more senior officials. But, as stressed
above, the Faragher-Ellerth analytical structure for employer vicarious
liability takes into account the harassment suffered by a particular victim
by requiring proof that the particular plaintiff unreasonably failed to take
advantage of preventive opportunities, as well as proof of the employer's
generally reasonable care. 2 The Faragher-Ellerth approach should be
as adaptable to the many different situations involving co-worker
discriminatory harassment, as it is for the variant situations of
supervisory harassment.
A negligence standard may not be as adaptable. Under a negligence
standard, a generally reasonable anti-harassment policy would insulate
an employer regardless of whether the failure of a particular victim to
utilize that policy was reasonable' and regardless of whether the victim
did everything he or she could do to stop the harassment.'61
Furthermore, as suggested above, the negligence standard could frustrate
employees seeking to recover under Title VII for co-worker harassment
even in cases where the particular employer did not have a generally
160. Cf Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 688-89 (8th Cir.
1997) (co-worker harasser had special relationship with branch manager).
161. Cf Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff
presented evidence that management ignored her complaints of co-worker harassment
and retaliated against her by withdrawing her more highly paid duties); Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1997) (victims suffered unrelenting harassment
from most co-workers).
Although it would be difficult to stretch agency law to provide doctrinal justification
for vicarious employer liability for customer harassment, the policy arguments in this
article nonetheless may be extended. Employees victimized by the harassment of their
employers' valuable customers or clients also may not be the least cost avoiders of this
harassment, in part because of their rational fear of retaliation. Furthermore, such
victims may be forced to continue to work where they are vulnerable to their harassers.
But see Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998); Quinn v. Green Tree
Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759 (2d Cir. 1998) (both post Faragher-Ellerth cases applying
negligence standards for employer liability for customer harassment).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 107-10.
163. See supra text accompanying note 31.
164. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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adequate anti-harassment policy. In such cases, a court applying a
negligence standard might find that the absence of the policy did not
cause the harassment, or that negligence, as an unintentional delict, does
not support a damage remedy under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.16
Notwithstanding the Court's efforts in Faragher and Ellerth to limit
its holding to supervisory harassment and to retain the negligence
standard for co-worker harassment, the latter standard ultimately may be
influenced by the approach of these cases. Consistent with the intent of
the Congress that passed the 1991 Ac1 6 and the vicarious liability
theory, courts probably will not prevent successful plaintiffs in co-
worker harassment cases from collecting at least compensatory damages
against negligent employers. Additionally, courts may assess the
reasonableness of a defendant employer's anti-harassment measures
from the perspective of a particular plaintiff who failed to take
advantage of those measures, rather than only from the perspective of
the employer. And notwithstanding the formal elements of negligence,
courts may not require Title VII harassment plaintiffs to prove that an
employer's deficient anti-harassment policy caused the plaintiff's
injuries simply because the perpetrators were co-workers rather than
supervisors. '
Still, absent Congressional action, there almost certainly will be at
least two important lasting practical effects of the limitation of the
Faragher-Ellerth vicarious liability approach to supervisory harassment
cases. First, courts will continue to place the burden of proving
negligence on plaintiffs in co-worker harassment cases. Second,
employers will be insulated from liability for co-worker harassment
when they conduct reasonable investigations after timely accusations by
alleged victims. This article suggests that this second effect will be
significant in two sets of cases: where the employer's reasonable
investigation ultimately proves inconclusive and does not arrest the
harassment;"' and where the employer's reasonable investigation after a
165. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
166. See supra note 29.
167. Given Faragher's emphasis on the power of supervisors to threaten retaliation,
courts may expand the definition of supervisor to include any company official with
authority to influence the job status of a victim, regardless of whether the victim is in the
official's direct chain of command. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
168. Cf. Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997) (employer that
conducted reasonable, though inconclusive investigations, was not liable under a
negligence theory for harassment, despite the timely complaints of the victim).
timely complaint is too late to prevent unexpected severe harassment
that has already occurred,' 9
169. Cf. Todd v. Ortho Biotech Inc., 138 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting, under
a negligence theory, employer liability for an isolated rape that the employer promptly
investigated and punished by discharge).
